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NEW ZEALAND ARCHAEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER



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THE DANGERS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND
CONTRACT ARCHAEOLOGY

Ross Cordy
94 - 740 Kalae Street
Waipahu, Hawaii

New Zealand is developing a governmental historic preservation programme and associated contract archaeology work. Based on correspondence that I have seen and talks with local archaeologists, problems seem to be arising. The resolution of these problems will critically affect the direction that archaeology in New Zealand will take at least for a decade. I point out here some serious flaws that have developed in the American system in the Pacific, hoping this discussion might help prevent a repetition of errors.

I have worked in the historic preservation and contract archaeology system in the American Pacific for over a decade - as a researcher doing contract work for institutions (Bishop Museum, University of Hawaii), as the owner of a private contract archaeology company (in Hawaii), as a federal government manager (the Archaeologist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Pacific Branch in 1977), and as a state manager (Staff Archaeologist for the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1978-1981). Thus, I have seen the development of historic preservation in Hawaii, the Trust Territory, the Northern Marianas, and to a lesser degree Guam and American Samoa. In brief, this warning is based on first-hand experience.

I first summarise the American system. Then problems in the American Pacific are noted, followed by possible solutions. As I do not know the details of New Zealand's system, I leave it to the reader to recognise parallel problems and to consider the ramifications. My main points are that in the American Pacific (1) the historic preservation programme does not have a very good record of preservation and recovery of valuable information and (2) contract archaeology has generally hindered research progress and the field of archaeology.

Background on the American system

The general framework. The United States' laws were established in the late 1960s. They were not actually put into effect until the early 1970s when funding to states began. The aim was to locate and register all valuable historic places, to protect them during federally-related construction, and to help develop them (ensuring maximum public benefit). (King et al, 1978 provides

an easy-to-read discussion of this programme). These laws have no applicability to private or non-federal government construction unless U.S. federal money or permits are involved.

The major United States' law is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. (It was amended in 1974 and altered slightly and renamed in 1980). A Presidential Executive Order (EO 11593) reinforced the law. The law established a framework which has seen the involvement of five organisational parts.

1. The U.S. Department of the Interior was made responsible for keeping the National Register of Historic Places, for issuing grant funds to the states and territories, and for ensuring these funds were properly spent.
2. Each state, or territory formed a Historic Preservation Office (SHPO). This office was to (1) survey its state's land, identify all valuable sites, and nominate them to the Register, (2) develop its state's valuable properties, and (3) check to see that federal agencies complied with laws to protect the valuable sites. Federal funds were awarded annually to each SHPO for survey and development.
3. The semi-independent Advisory Council on Historic Preservation was formed at the national level. Its task was also to make sure federal agencies complied with laws to protect valuable sites. If destruction could not be avoided, this agency had to approve plans for salvage excavations.
4. Federal agencies doing, funding, or permitting construction are required to consider impacts on valuable historic places (those on, or eligible to be on, the National Register). Their impact assessments are reviewed by the SHPO and the Advisory Council.
5. Contract archaeologists are involved. They are hired to do surveys by the SHPO and by federal agencies to do surveys and salvage excavations in impact areas.

In this system, two basic kinds of archaeological work occur - (1) survey and (2) salvage excavation. Survey is done to determine if valuable sites are present in an area. The terms "reconnaissance" and "intensive survey" have been applied to steps in the survey process. Reconnaissance is an initial check. An intensive survey is done in detail, with test excavations to help assess site value. Salvage excavation is done only when valuable sites cannot be avoided in actions of federal agencies.

The framework of SHPOs in the American Pacific. There are five "state" or "territory" level entities in the American Pacific-Hawaii State, the Territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (including Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, Kosrae, and the Marshall Islands), and American Samoa. Each has a SHPO. Hawaii's has been in existence

since the late 1960s; Guam's and the Trust Territory's since about 1975. The Northern Marianas' began in 1978, after formerly being part of the Trust Territory's SHPO. (I have little knowledge of American Samoa's SHPO).

Each SHPO is headed by an Historic Preservation Officer and theoretically staffed with a minimum of one professional archaeologist, one historian, one historical architect and one architectural historian. (Professional in the archaeological position means a Master's degree or higher, by Department of the Interior regulations). The Trust Territory has local Historic Preservation Offices in each former district centre (Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, Kosrae and the Marshall Islands) which are appendages of the central Historic Preservation. The Northern Marianas has adopted a form of the Trust Territory's organisation - having local committees on each island. These SHPOs critically determine the nature of historic preservation within their jurisdictions.

Most of these SHPOs carry out some archaeological survey and review contract archaeological work done for federal agencies working in their state or territory. A major exception occurs in the Trust Territory, where the SHPO since 1978 has either done all survey and salvage work itself or arranged it to be done. In brief, the federal agencies have asked the SHPO to act on their behalf to help meet their legal obligations.

A last point ... In Hawaii, strong state historic preservation laws also exist, requiring state agencies to consider impacts on historic sites. These laws have affected the private sector too. Many large hotel and resort developments are now preceded by archaeological work.

Problems

A number of serious problems have arisen in the operation of the above system over the years. Some exist in all American Pacific areas, some only in one area.

1. What is a valuable site? Recall, all valuable (or significant) sites are to go on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places. Problems have arisen on how to decide which sites are valuable. Most non-archaeologists and federal agency planners expect such sites to be large, impressive sites - those valuable for exhibition or of clear scientific value. However, the law states that any site containing information of value to understanding pre-history or history can be placed on the Register. In theory, this

point means that sites can also be valuable for their information content. These are two quite different concepts of value ("exhibitions" vs "information content"), and they have led to confusion.

Sites valuable for exhibition (or long-term scientific work) are generally easily recognisable.

Sites valuable for their information content have created vast problems. First, the laymen have a hard time understanding why tiny, unimpressive sites are valuable. Archaeologists and historic preservationists have done a poor job of clearly and easily explaining why. Thus, confrontation has arisen between developers and preservationists. Second, archaeologists (through different academic training, interests, etc.) often do not agree which sites contain valuable information. Different archaeologists advise federal agencies or SHPOs which sites are valuable on different projects, so no uniform application of value occurs. For example, in Hawaii at Barber's Point on Oahu, originally only sites with potential to yield artefacts of use for cultural historical studies were recommended as valuable. Other sites, however, had value to study permanent and temporary housing and thus land use, social organisation and population problems. Still others were later found to contain information relevant to bird populations and their exploitation. In this case, the federal agency involved (the Corps of Engineers) recognised a greater range of valuable sites, so the original recommendation alone was not accepted. In most cases, however, in Hawaii this has not occurred. The original archaeologist's recommendations have been accepted by the SHPO, and many sites of value to different research problems have been lost.

2. Problems in preserving the sites valuable for exhibition.

Ideally, all these types of sites are to be found through survey and placed on the National Register. Most are probably known, so this task should not be great. Even determining sites of long-term scientific research value should not be too difficult to list, if archaeologists would think about the problem.

One problem in identification, however, is distinguishing between sites of this type which have national, state, and local (e.g., county) value. The U.S. Register can include all, but this policy has proved awkward. Hawaii has a register system which potentially can resolve this problem. It has two categories of valuable - High Value and Valuable. The first are the very best sites, presumably those that would go on the National Register. The second stay on the State Register. In practice, however, fishponds and heiau (temples) seem to dominate the High Value category - hardly representative of Hawaiian sites.

A second problem is that the list or survey of such sites is largely incomplete. Even those that are well known to the local public are often not recorded on the Register. And the probability of new types of sites or sites of long-term research value being discovered by archaeologists is not clearly understood by planners.

A further problem is the preservation bureaucracy. The process of nominating these valuable sites has become one of correctly filling out the proper forms. Listing of valuable sites in the Trust Territory were delayed for months by the Department of the Interior to obtain minor items of information. If anything, the regulations and form-filling focus has increased over the years that the historic preservation system has been operating.

Limited funds and staff at the SHPO level have seriously prevented the development of most valuable sites. Restoration of European-style buildings involves architectural planning costing tens of thousands of dollars, followed by restoration which costs even more. Prehistoric sites require archaeological analyses to plan and conduct restoration. However, only a portion of a SHPO's budget goes to development, and given relatively small budgets, this means few dollars. For example in financial years 1980 and 1981 the Trust Territory HPO had more funds than all other Pacific HPOs - about \$400,000/year. Yet only about \$100,000 went to development of sites per year, allowing work on only a handful of sites when many more desperately needed work. Hawaii has the extra benefit of large private sector financing of European-era architecture.

Additional problems again arise from government bureaucrats. To acquire development funds, a site must be on the National Register. The Trust Territory HPO was rapidly trying to get vital sites on the Register to preserve and develop them prior to termination of the Trusteeship. Every year delays in processing occurred, and in 1980 the Department of Interior staff failed to process sites in time to receive development funds. Thus, the sites went unprotected and developed into the last years of the Trusteeship. In sum, no great flexibility existed in the bureaucratic framework, and there was little appreciation of local problems. As a result, many valuable sites were not adequately protected.

3. Effective protection of sites of value due to their information content and adequate research to retrieve this information. All sites contain some information of value to an area's prehistory. Once destroyed this information is lost. It is thus part of a historic preservation programme to identify these sites, protect them until the valuable information is collected, and to see that this collection is adequately done.

Identification of such sites in an archaeological survey is fairly straightforward. However, the laws assume all such sites in a state or territory can be found. This is an impossibility. Archaeologists may overlook some sites due to present day techniques (e.g. failure to find all sub-surface sites). Also funds are never sufficient for such a total survey. In Hawaii and Guam the first few years of their SHPOs existence was spent identifying already known sites. Yet these sites represented skewed samples (being temples, petroglyphs, fishponds and the like in Hawaii and latte structure sites in Guam). The great number of smaller sites vital for understanding local prehistory were not known - perhaps 100 sites for every 1 known. Only a few thorough surveys existed in the American Pacific into the late 1970s - e.g., the ahupua'a studies in Hawaii (Lapakahi, Makaha, Halawa, Kaloko, Anaehoomalu), Reinman's survey on Guam, and Davidson's survey on Nukuoro. Even today after intensive survey in all areas, I doubt 10% of Hawaii, Guam, and the Trust Territory have been intensively surveyed. The figure is much, much lower for American Samoa and the Northern Marianas. Yet hundred of thousands of dollars have been spent (about \$1,000,000 in the Trust Territory since 1978). This means that few of the sites valuable for their information content are known. Many of these unknown sites are being destroyed yearly by private construction and activities.

Thus, I repeat identification of all these sites is virtually impossible. Even when such sites are identified, protection is far from guaranteed. Registers have generally been ineffective. Hawaii's State Register has been the best with a Reserve category for sites whose valuable information has yet to be removed. But as noted earlier, archaeologists of different interests have recommended different sites for this category. Other sites (still with valuable information) go into a Marginal, or unprotected category and can be destroyed. The only agency which could have taken effective stand to see a wider range of research topics (and information) uniformly protected was the Hawaii HPO. It has generally failed to do so, because staff workload has prevented an effective review. (The Trust Territory HPO applied such a wide range, uniform approach, but has done this informally without a Register. Success has been due to a much smaller workload and the centralisation of all federal agency historic preservation matters in the HPO). Federal historic preservation offices serve little use in these problems, because they rarely have professional staff with Pacific expertise and their workload is immense.

Even when sites go on a Register or are considered important for protection, actual protection is difficult. Without field staff monitoring construction, these little unimpressive sites can be easily destroyed. Thus, real protection becomes extremely difficult, often near impossible.

The recovery of information, or research, part of the preservation process is perhaps the most critical, and it has some of the greatest problems.

1. Quality of research has varied greatly. There have been excellent projects, but also very many bad ones. For example, in the Trust Territory, a project director at an important beach site in the Marianas (Laulau) failed to record vital stratigraphy rendering the data virtually worthless. Other projects in Hawaii have failed to consider a full range of research problems and have not recorded vital information.

In nearly all cases, the poor projects have been done by unqualified workers. The Historic Preservation programme demands a minimum of an M.A. in archaeology for the Principal Investigator. Often this is overlooked by SHPOs or federal agencies. A result has been bad work. Professional societies have arisen to reputedly eliminate this problem, but they have allowed easy entrance to non-M.A. workers and have thus had no effect on quality control.

Power for regulating quality control does lie with the SHPOs and the Advisory Council who can demand a Principal Investigator have at least an M.A. in archaeology. In the American Pacific such a policy has been instituted only by the Trust Territory SHPO. The quality of research has seen a marked improvement because this policy exists.

2. A basic flaw in the entire historic preservation system is that not enough time is allowed for adequate research. An intensive survey with some test excavation simply does not enable adequate recovery of information, or often an adequate analysis of value. Typically, if 100 sites are found in a region, intensive survey will record vital information for about 20% (e.g., wall heights, widths; data from tiny shelters with virtually no deposits). The remaining 80% will contain valuable information, but only 10% may be test excavated and then with a $1m^2$ pit per site. Then usually a handful of sites are recommended for salvage. The others are no longer protected. The result is that a step in research is skipped - further excavations in the sites with valuable information to truly answer research problems. A vast amount of information in Hawaii has been lost because this step does not exist.

This problem could be avoided if the SHPO Staff Archaeologist or a federal agency archaeologist realises more work is needed. More survey could be called for, or salvage of more sites could be requested. This has been done in the Trust Territory by the SHPO.

However, extra research takes time and money. In the Trust Territory, the Yap Airport Salvage of burials cost about

\$100,000), leading to some disgruntlement among construction agencies. Also extra work was needed at the Palau Airport. Efforts must be made by both construction and preservation agencies to have archaeological work started well before construction, to allow for full archaeological research and to preclude construction delays.

3. There is no cohesive research approach in any of the American Pacific areas, with the exception of the Trust Territory. In the Trust Territory, annual SHPO survey grants have been directed to fill gaps in areal coverage of the islands and to address a wider range of research topics. No clear research policy exists in the other SHPOs. In all the areas (the Trust Territory included), contract archaeology (related to construction and undertaken for, or by, the SHPOs for federal agencies) is done on a case by case basis with little or no plan of overall research needs.

This problem is in part the fault of the SHPOs and archaeologists in the different regions. SHPOs can establish an overall plan - identifying regions and site types that need study and research problems that need study. They can do this planning arbitrarily or with input from archaeologists specialising in their region. This has not been done - although the Trust Territory HPO has done this in relation to regions needing study. Archaeologists can voluntarily band together, formulate such plans, and urge SHPOs adopt them. However, the only regional associations of archaeologists have been those in Hawaii. The Coordinating Committee for Hawaiian Archaeology from about 1970-1980 failed to develop such a plan. The new Hawaiian organisation to my knowledge has yet to take up this problem.

This lack of a research plan has led to chaos in Hawaii. Each project is studied in relation to itself. A certain research focus or method may be adopted, but many others are ignored. In my opinion, research work on general problems in Hawaii has ground to a halt since the early 1970s. The number of non-contract, or pure research, projects in the 1970s number less than 10, while contract projects number in the hundreds.

A number of problems desperately have needed research in Hawaii - e.g., early settlement, the development of complex societies, the shift to leeward areas, population growth and the growth of irrigated agriculture. Virtually no work has been focused on these topics. Occasionally, contract archaeology has touched on the topics (particularly recent work in Kawainui Marsh and on Kauai on early settlement); but without a framework of questions and needed answers, contract work has not been able to test questions to their fullest.

In some cases, the lack of a research focus has had serious consequences. For example, on the topic of complex society development, work is needed in windward and more optimal leeward areas. Large development and contract work, however, has been in arid leeward areas. Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s small private developments (single homes, stores, farms) have been altering land and destroying sites in windward and optimal leeward areas. Soon the regions vital to studying complex society developments may be too badly altered to ever get a good answer to this unique development in Hawaii.

This is not to say that contract work has not involved research. Data has been compiled on some interesting problems (e.g., adaptation to severe or arid leeward areas - South Kohala and North Kona on Hawaii, the Kihei-Makena area of Maui, Kahoolawe, Barbers' Point on Oahu), but no synthesis and general development of further questions to be answered has occurred. Again, the lack of a research plan has limited the benefits of the studies.

4. Funding problems are critical. Huge amounts of money have been wasted. Projects are over-priced. In Hawaii I have seen project bids 3-4 times higher than a realistic bid. This approach has antagonized federal agencies, particularly when the result is sloppy and inadequate (which is not uncommon). More important it has hindered the development of research benefitting the public. More projects could have been done with lower and reasonable budgets.

This problem is the fault of archaeologists and the SHPOs. The SHPOs, if staffed with qualified professionals, can assess unreasonable budgets and reject them. In the Trust Territory we tried to do this, often to the disgruntlement of archaeologists. The archaeologists in turn seem to have become too greedy. The spirit of doing archaeology for research and increasing knowledge seems gone in Hawaii, being replaced by the desire for the "big money" of contract archaeology. In the long run, this problem will boomerang, and funds will totally disappear unless responsible spending of public funds occurs.

Possible resolutions to the problems

Defining a valuable site. I believe it is vital to distinguish between sites valuable for exhibition and those solely valuable for their information content. This clarification is important for gaining public understanding and support (and that of planners). It is also important to separate the real problems of exhibition for those of research.

A Register of Places is useful, but it must distinguish these categories of value. I find a modification of Hawaii's

system useful - High (National) Value for Exhibition, Valuable for Local Exhibition, Reserve Value (to protect sites solely with valuable information), No Value (sites with the valuable information removed or recorded). For a Register to be useful for exhibition and research, it should be detailed in description with maps. I find New Zealand's computer register of immense appeal in this respect, because it can contain detail and thus has immense research potential. At the same time, sites of exhibition value can be culled separately from the computer.

Effective preservation. A heavy focus needs to be placed on identifying the sites valuable for exhibition and preserving them. Many are known, so this task can rapidly be accomplished (with allowance for finding new sites in the future).

Effective protection and research. The most critical point to resolving these problems is that all sites valuable solely for their information content cannot be identified, protected, and studied even with five times the funding and staff levels of the present Historic Preservation programmes - and such funding and staffing are unlikely. I argue that this point must be accepted and that a method of identifying, protecting and studying only some sites must be developed. Only this approach would see greatest returns for the public's benefit.

First, this means that archaeologists need to meet and decide:

1. which areas need survey (e.g., unknown areas), and
2. what research problems need priority attention, (a) in what regions and (b) what kinds of sites need detailed investigation.

The government agency supervising protection and research should be convinced to adopt this plan. This agency should then focus its survey funds and salvage funds on projects solely relevant to these problems. The plans can be revised periodically to allow for new research interests.

Second, the government agency managing protection and research must by necessity, in my opinion, be staffed by a good number of professional archaeologists, historians and architects. In the case of archaeologists, I highly recommend they be PhDs with a knowledge of a wide range of research problems. These people can best put into action the research plan. Only professionals can adequately decide how to allot grant funds to projects vital for the research plans. They must review each construction project and rapidly select those for study relevant to the research plans. The other projects would be allowed to proceed without study. Again, this is not the best of all worlds for a preservationist, but it is a realistic choice given funding and staff time. Then this staff must manage each project.

Here is where quality control and fiscal responsibility enters the picture. I urge Principal Investigators be PhDs, or those with several years experience beyond the MA (where one truly gets quality theoretical training). Professionals in a SHPO can best evaluate qualifications. This does not mean people of lesser qualifications cannot do projects; they simply must be under a qualified PhD. A crude analogy is that a doctor rather than a medical student is a fully qualified professional. Professionals can also best review proposals to ensure quality research plans and a reasonable budget and can best review reports to see quality products result. Inferior projects should be rejected and redone. Last, professional staff in the HPO can also more effectively evaluate when a site's information content is largely recovered. This evaluation in turn ensures sufficient analysis.

One critical point remains. The public must be made aware of the increase in knowledge. One solution could be bi-annual easy-to-read books on different research topics put out by the government agency. If these steps are done, it is likely public support would continue.

Effective bureaucratic organisation. A pivotal point to resolving historic preservation problems in the American Pacific is establishing an efficient, professional and flexible organisation.

In the Trust Territory, federal agencies and the HPO act on their behalf to meet historic preservation obligations. This greatly speeded up work by reducing a step in decision-making. By the nature of this system, from the start, the agencies and the HPO agreed on approach. Thus, when work was done, only the relevant federal historic preservation office had to be approached, rather than consultation among the federal agency, the federal historic preservation office and the SHPO. It has also enabled uniform management control - which has led to improvement of project quality and a reduction in costs.

In Hawaii, this has not been the case. The Corps of Engineers, the City and County of Honolulu, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Navy, and undoubtedly other federal agencies (or their recipients) have had their own archaeologists and/or have dealt independently with archaeological contractors. Then their assessments were reviewed by the SHPO and the federal preservation offices. Chaos has reigned, with the SHPO and preservation agencies having a hard time keeping track of the work and controlling it. Guam's and American Samoa's cases are like Hawaii's at a much smaller scale.

I highly recommend the Trust Territory approach. There is no need for federal agencies in the American Pacific to handle their

archaeological work independently. It creates chaos, friction, and more work. If they work through a qualified SHPO, the system works better. It does, however, require adequate staffing in the SHPO. The Trust Territory has had one professional archaeologist. It really needed two or three. Hawaii with a larger work-load could use five archaeologists. Still, costs are lower and programmes more efficient with centralisation.

At the national level, I believe that it would be best to separate preservation of valuable sites and of analysis of sites with valuable information into different agencies. At present, recall, the Department of the Interior keeps the Register and gives out grants for survey (recovery and location of exhibition-value sites) and development, while the Advisory Council watches over data recovery from both types of sites (most of the information-value type). As national sites of exhibition value are landmarks, they are equivalent to national parks (requiring protection and qualified restoration). In the United States, the National Park Service has long specialised in these tasks. I believe it should be in charge of the sites valuable for exhibition. The sites valuable for information are relevant to scientific research, and I believe an agency staffed with scientists should be in charge of work at these sites (and any research work at exhibition-value sites). This agency should be semi-independent to avoid pressure to overlook destruction of these less impressive sites. The Advisory Council could easily be converted to this role, with survey funds shifted to it to award to the SHPOs.

It is vital that the SHPOs and the Advisory Council be staffed with professional archaeologists. In my opinion they should have PhDs or be very near having a PhD. This is to ensure a wide grasp of theoretical problems which most MAs from American universities do not have. The Trust Territory programme has worked well because it had a succession of three PhD archaeologists with Pacific and theoretical specialties. Hawaii's programme has stumbled around because (1) it rarely has had a PhD archaeologist and (2) when it has had one, the individual has been so overburdened with work that his effectiveness has been limited. Guam, the Northern Marianas and Hawaii have all greatly suffered when they have had no PhD archaeologists, not due to the lack of effort or dedication of their workers, rather due to their lack of professional expertise. (Again, my analogy to the doctor and the medical student). The Advisory Council should have one regional PhD archaeologist for every major region of the country. The benefits can be seen with an example. Since Dr Thomas King joined the Council in 1979, the Pacific region has vastly benefitted from his presence due to his knowledge of the area and its archaeology.

Last, this organisation must be flexible. Form filling must be reduced to a minimum. Laws and regulations must be flexibly applied to the local circumstances. To achieve these goals, the national bureaucracy needs to be attuned to local problems through constant visits (not junkets, but visits).

Conclusion

In the United States, historic preservation has been the cause of the boom in contract archaeology. A great deal of fieldwork has been done. However, as seen, I seriously question the general benefits of preservation and contract work to date. These problems could be resolved, but it may be too late. Vast spending of money and no clear comprehension of results by the public has led to a drastic reduction in historic preservation funds in 1982 under President Reagan and the possibility of virtual elimination of the programme's budget in 1983. And quite frankly without a resolution of the problems, I think archaeology as a research discipline and the public may be better off with the programme eliminated.

In New Zealand you are just underway with your historic preservation programme. You have many points benefitting you at present. Among other things, these include: a research atmosphere (instead of a profit-making one), limited development, excellent amateur and professional associations, a relatively small government, and a register with excellent research potential. However, Auckland and other major centres are growing. Development will undoubtedly increase. Accordingly, preservation workloads will increase, and contract archaeological work will be needed. Before this begins, I urge you to consider the possibility of the problems noted in this paper arising in New Zealand. For archaeology's and the public's sake, do not lose an overall research focus. Keep your preservation bureaucracy flexible and staffed with highly professional research scientists. And remember, the public must receive benefits - both in preserved sites they can visit and in books and artefacts (preserved information) they can read and see. Without public understanding and support, there is no guarantee the programme or its funds will endure.

Postscript

This paper was written while I was a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Auckland (Term 1, 1982). I returned to Hawaii in late May 1982. Although there are a number of interesting contract projects ongoing or recently completed (e.g., the Bishop Museum's studies in the field systems of Waimea on Hawaii Island), I believe the statements in this paper still generally hold true.